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INTRODUCTION 
Human rights are often taken to epitomize the existence of global constitutional law 1 or, at 
least, of global constitutionalism (see Klabbers et al. 2009; Wiener et al. 2012). Since 1945, 
human rights have been protected through both domestic (constitutional) human rights 
law (DHRL) and international2 (universal and/or regionaP) human rights law (IHRL), 
and monitored and interpreted by their corresponding domestic and international human 
rights institutions.4 
This has led to well-known and extensive discussions about the dual (see Neuman 
2003; Waldron 2011; Besson 2015a, 2017a) constitutionalization (or positivization) of 
human rights and/or about the duality of constitutional law itself (see Kumm 2009, 2012; 
Besson 2009a, 2014; Krisch 2010). Previous discussions have explored this constitutional 
duality by looking at how international human rights law may be regarded as a (formal 
or material) constitutional regime within international law (see Gardbaum 2008; Besson 
2009a), on the one hand, and at how it may endorse a constitutional function domestically 
and/or internationally (see Gardbaum 2008; Besson 2015a), on the other. This chapter 
takes the debate one step further and complements these dual approaches to human rights 
law with a more integrated conception or, in short, with a truly transnational or global5 
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1 
'Constitution' or 'constitutional law' is used here in a thick sense to refer to a set of legal 
norms of higher rank (entrenched; in a formal sense) and whose content is fundamental or con-
stitutive (in a material sense). 'Constitutionalism' amounts to any kind of theory pertaining to the 
existence or content of constitutional law. See also Besson (2009a). 
2 This chapter focuses on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
European Court of Human Rights ' (ECtHR's) case-law. Some of the argument may then be gener-
alized to other regimes in IHRL, as I will explain. 
3 Both 'regional' and 'universal' regimes of international human rights law are embraced under 
the umbrella notion of 'international human rights law'. Their relations are those between regimes 
of international law (see Brems 2014; Besson 2017b). 
4 Unless specified otherwise in the course of the argument, domestic and international human 
rights 'institutions' include courts as much as other legislative or administrative bodies. 
5 Of course, the term 'global' could also be used to refer to the universal scope of IHRL by 
contrast to their regional scope. In this chapter, however, it will be used interchangeably with 
'transnational', to encompass all the law-making processes or sources of human rights law whether 
domestic or international and, in the latter case, whether regional or universal. 
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one. It proposes to explore the extent to which the domestic and international human 
rights law regimes are complementary and hence best approached together as 'trans-
national human rights law' (see McCrudden 2000, p. 530; Hessler 2005, p. 37; Waldron 
2005, p. 423, 2011, 2012; Besson 2015a, 2017a) or, as it is sometimes also referred to, as 
'transnational constitutional law' (see McCrudden 2000, p. 530). 
While scholars have mapped transnational aspects of the human rights practice, and 
especially transnational comparisons in domestic (constitutional) and international 
human rights law (see, for example, McCrudden 2000, 2007, 2013, 2015, 2017; Halmai 
2012; Hirschi 2014; Jackson and Tush net 2014), this is not yet true of their theoretical 
or philosophical underpinnings. Curiously, the exact nature, justifications, determination 
and implications of the 'transnationality' of human rights law remain largely under-
theorized (see McCrudden 2000, pp. 522, 532; see, however, Waldron 2005, 2011, 2012; 
Besson 20 l 5a; McCrudden 2017). 
This chapter aims to remedy this theoretical gap. Starting from what it describes as 
the transnational practice of human rights law and developing the best interpretation 
thereof, the chapter discusses what transnational human rights law both does and should 
amount to, and especially from where it could draw its legitimate authority. The chapter's 
argument is three-pronged, accordingly. The next section differentiates the notion of 
transnational human rights law from other conceptions of transnationality used in legal 
scholarship. In the third section, the chapter develops a transnational interpretation of the 
domestic and international regimes of human rights law that both fits and justifies their 
dual and complementary practice. The fourth section accounts for some of the central 
methods for determining transnational human rights law, and in particular human rights 
comparison and the transnational consensus it identifies. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of some implications for the future practice of domestic and international 
human rights law. 
THE TRANSNATIONALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
DEFINED 
The 'transnationality' of human rights law captures what is specific about its sources or 
law-making processes, both domestic and international, and about each of them taken 
individually or together with the others (see also Besson 2015a, 2017a). More specifi-
cally, the transnational nature of human rights law corresponds, as I argue in the next 
section, to the dual and complementary processes or sources through which domestic and 
international human rights laws are made, interpreted and enforced, and hence mutually 
validated and legitimated. 
In connection with law generally, first, transnationality has been used to refer to and 
qualify, alternatively or in combination (see, for example, Scott 2009; Shaffer 2016), a 
variety of legal dimensions. It has been used by reference to, for instance: a legal order/a 
set of legal norms or standards distinct from domestic and international law (see, for 
example, Scott 2009, pp. 873- 4) or, on the contrary, combining both (see, for example, 
Halliday and Shaffer 2015; Shaffer 2016); private legal subjects and/or lawmakers that are 
distinct from those of public domestic and international law (see, for example, Muir Watt 
2011; Michaels 2014); a legal context including cross-border issues or problems involving 
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more than one state or jurisdiction (see, for example, Jessup 1956, pp. 2- 3, 136); a complex 
type of normativity beyond legality that mixes social, religious, moral and legal norms; or, 
finally, a pluri-disciplinary (often, socio-legal) and/or critical method in legal theory (see, 
for example, Teubner 1996; Twining 2009; Scott 2009; Zumbansen 2013, 2015) or even in 
legal education (see, for example, Arjona et al. 2015; Zumbansen 2015). 
Human rights, secondly, are often mentioned as a paradigm example in discussions 
of transnational law. Their transnational dimensions may match some of the previous 
dimensions of transnational law, albeit not necessarily all of them. The qualification 
'transnational' has been used to refer to and qualify, alternatively or in combination (see, 
for example, Vandenhole 2012; Gibney and Vandenhole 2014), specific dimensions of 
the human rights practice, and for instance the following: the identity of human rights 
duty-bearers beyond the state, and especially private (individual or collective) actors 
(see, for example, Vandenhole 2012; Pavlakos 2015) and/or international institutions 
(see, for example, Besson 2015b; Vandenhole 2015); the making of human rights stand-
ards, whether they are private law (see, for example, Vandenhole 2012) or even soft law 
standards (see, for example, Engle Merry 2015); domestic fora of human rights litigation 
outside of or including the state of jurisdiction (see, for example, Zumbansen 2005), of 
judicial dialogue on human rights (see, for example, Zoethout 2015) or of cross-border 
human rights advocacy by non-state actors (see, for example, Keck and Sikkink 1998); the 
scope of states' human rights duties beyond their respective (territorial or extra-territorial) 
jurisdiction (see, for example, Gibney et al. 1999; Skogly and Gibney 2002; Besson 2015b, 
2017c; Pavlakos 2015; Vandenhole 2015), and what becomes their application's condition 
or trigger if it is no longer a matter of jurisdiction; the method of determination and inter-
pretation of human rights' duties, whether it is by analogy, comparison, borrowing (see, 
for example, Klug 2005); or, finally, a method of enquiry or field of socio-legal research 
(see, for example, Klug 2005). 
None of these conceptions of the transnationality of human rights law captures this 
chapter's understanding of human rights law as an integrated or common regime of law. 
Importantly, moreover, the transnationality of human rights law, as it is understood in 
this chapter, should not be conflated with legal plurality (often also referred to as 'legal 
pluralism'; Besson 2009b; 2012a; 2015c) in human rights law, whether in the socio-legal 
sense of the concept or the strictly legal one. 
Starting with the former, first, that is to say legal plurality in the socio-legal or anthro-
pological sense (see Engle Merry 1988; Zumbansen 2010), the proposed argument is 
compatible with the plurality of sources of norms at play in a given legal situation, some 
stemming from official or public law and others less so. However, this is not what the 
transnationality of human rights law discussed here is about. The proposed argument 
focuses instead on human rights as public or official legal rights and duties, and not on 
other types of norms applicable in the legal context such as religious norms or private 
norms in particular. Its object is the human rights' duties established by and for states (see 
Besson 2013b; 2015b) and hence those that are generated through the states' domestic and 
international public law. 
With respect to the latter, secondly, it is important to emphasize that the relationship 
propounded between domestic and international human rights law is one of comple-
mentarity, and not of competition. The pluralistic qualification should be retained for 
the relations between competing international legal noi·ms and regimes, including within 
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international human rights law itself (for instance, between regional and universal interna-
tional human rights law or within any of them), that protect the same object in different 
ways and between which nonnative conflicts may arise. It is not the way domestic and 
international human rights law relate in practice, however, and not the way I argue they 
should either (contra: Krisch 2010; Kumm 2012). Both sets of legal norms protect the 
same rights, and there can be clashes between domestic and international institutions' 
interpretations of these same rights. However, these interpretations do not compete, as 
we shall see, but apply only in a sequence and in order to complement one another. This 
relationship of complementarity (or subsidiarity stricto sensu; Besson 2016b) cannot be 
qualified as pluralistic, as a result (see Hessler 2005; Besson 2014; 2015a). 
THE TRANSNATIONALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
JUSTIFIED 
What the complementarity or transnationality of human rights law captures is how both 
the domestic and the international legal norms protecting human rights relate in a way 
that is uncommon in international law (Besson 2015a; see also McCrudden 2015, pp. 
536- 8): they are not only situated in a relationship of top-down transposition and/or 
enforcement of an international standard in domestic law, but also in a relationship of 
bottom-up international recognition and consolidation of the transnational or common 
law stemming from different domestic legal orders into an international standard. More 
specifically, that relationship is mutual, on the one hand, to the extent that the domestic 
and international human rights law-making and law-ascertaining processes are compara-
tive and hence transnational at both the domestic and the international levels. It is also 
dynamic, on the other hand, to the extent that it does not only start domestically and end 
internationally, but there is constant normative toing and froing between the two levels 
of legal protection. 
The minimal content of international human rights law evolves together with that of 
their transnational domestic practice as a result. This usually implies a levelling-up of 
the international minimal human rights standard, but we cannot preclude some degree 
of levelling down. The latter is made harder by the international entrenchment of the 
transnational minimal human rights standard; because that standard requires the same 
level of transnational commonality to evolve one way or the other, levelling down is rare 
in practice (on moral progress and human rights, see, for example, Buchanan 2013). 
We may wonder about the justification for this transnational legality of human rights 
in practice. Prima facie, indeed, international law has the kind of universal material scope 
that matches that of universal moral rights. It would seem therefore to provide the privi-
leged order for the legal protection of human rights knowing that international human 
rights law claims to bind all states and hence to be universally justified. This applies 
whether legal human rights are merely considered to recognize existing universal moral 
rights, or (also) to contribute to these rights' specification or even to their creation (on 
moral and legal human rights, see Besson 2012b, 2013a). 
The primary justification for the transnational legality of human rights lies in the 
egalitarian and accordingly democratic dimension of human rights. As I have argued 
elsewhere, human rights are constitutive of our equal basic moral status (see Buchanan 
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2010b; Besson 2012b). It follows that human rights' holders and duty-bearers should 
participate in the process of recognizing and specifying their equal and mutual rights. 
Accordingly, the process through which their recognition and specification take place 
ought to be egalitarian and public, and include all those whose rights are affected and 
whose equality is at stake. What this means is that human rights should be recognized and 
specified as equal rights through a procedure that guarantees their public equality, that is, 
a democratic procedure. As a result, given international law's inherent democratic limi-
tations, but also because international human rights' duties bind states to people under 
their jurisdiction and not some international community of states and/or individuals (see 
Besson 20 l 5b ), using international law as the sole order where we should recognize funda-
mental and general human interests as sufficiently important to generate duties of states 
at the domestic level would not be sufficiently egalitarian and democratically legitimate 
(see Cohen 2008, pp. 599- 600; Besson 2013c). 
At the same time, of course, certain minimal egalitarian conditions have to be met 
for the domestic recognition and specification of human rights to be democratic. These 
minimal conditions of public equality should be guaranteed externally and constrain the 
domestic polity. This is where international human rights law, and the minimal democratic 
guarantees it constitutes such as the right to political participation, freedom of expres-
sion and association and non-discrimination rights, come into the picture. Howeve1~ for 
these minimal democratic and human rights constraints in international law to be demo-
cratically legitimate in the first place, they should draw from the transnational common 
ground shared in the practice of states that regard each other as democratic. Importantly, 
they need not have (yet) been protected as rights to be recognized as international human 
rights, but only substantially realized so as to constitute a minimal common ground 
among democratic states. 
International human rights law's democratic legitimacy requires, therefore, that it origi-
nates from the transnational consolidation of the domestic human rights law and practice 
of democratic states, albeit constraining these states minimally in return at the same time 
(see Besson 2011, 2013c, 2015a). Later on, only the domestic human rights practices 
regarded as minimally democratic according to the common standards entrenched in 
international human rights law may and should be considered in the further transnational 
development of these minimal international human rights standards and as potential 
candidates for entrenchment into a new international minimal human rights standard 
(see Hessler 2005, p. 48 ff.). 
This democratic argument for the legitimacy of the transnationality of human rights 
law, and the mutual validation of domestic and international human rights law, cor-
responds to what I have referred to elsewhere as the mutual democratic legitimation of 
domestic and international human rights law (see Besson 2011, 2013c, 2015a; see also 
Buchanan 2004, pp. 187- 9, 2011; Buchanan and Powell 2008, pp. 348- 9). The interaction 
between (international) human rights and (domestic) citizens' rights is also reminiscent 
of Hannah Arendt's universal right to have particular rights and the complementarity 
between the universal and the particular. Human rights are first specified as citizens' 
rights, but citizens' rights progressively consolidate into human rights which constrain 
them in return while also developing further through them (see Arendt 1951; Benhabib 
2011, pp. 16, 126; Habermas 2011, pp. 31 - 2, 36- 8). 
Besides the democratic justification for the transnational legalization of human rights, I 
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should also mention a second justification: an epistemic justification. Given the concrete 
nature of human rights duties, their existence and content is best identified in domestic 
circumstances. Human rights being equal rights, this is indeed the socio-comparative 
context in which the general threats to the interest protected by a given human right can 
be assessed and the potential corresponding duties identified (see Besson 2012b, 2013b). 
Again, however, this specification requires some minimal epistemic conditions to be 
respected. These conditions are best imposed from the outside through international 
human rights law (for example, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, religious 
freedom and non-discrimination rights) . However, this should be done in a way that starts 
from the epistemic conditions experimented and tried out previously in domestic circum-
stances in the context of the recognition of human rights and the determination of the 
corresponding duties. As before, once these minimal epistemic conditions are entrenched 
internationally, only the practice of the states embodying them shall be considered for the 
further interpretation and development of international human rights law and with a view 
to considering their new common interpretations as part of the international standard. 
This approach to human rights epistemology, like Allen Buchanan's, relies on a moral 
epistemology that is 'social' (see Buchanan 2010a, 2017), and even socio-political given 
how huma1i rights are constitutive of our public status as equals. Because our social 
context may also distort our beliefs about our rights, the epistemic conditions experi-
mented and tried out previously in domestic circumstances where human rights have 
developed should be those where these rights are already substantively realized. This is 
what Buchanan has described as the 'reflexive' dimension of the moral epistemology of 
human rights (see Buchanan 2017) . 
These minimal epistemic conditions for the determination of human rights come close, 
in their role and content, to the minimal democratic conditions referred to earlier. It is 
actually common in practice to see a combination of the democratic and the epistemic 
justifications for the complementarity of domestic and international human rights law. 
From a democratic theory perspective, the combination is not surprising since epis-
temic justifications are often put forward for democratic procedures themselves (see, for 
example, Marti 2006). What this means for the epistemology of human rights, is that 
the minimal epistemic conditions actually amount to some minimal form of substantive 
realization of democracy. 
A ready objection to the epistemic argument for transnational human rights law, and 
arguably also to the democratic one, is the universality of human rights ('universality-
objection'). Someone could indeed consider that the transnational consolidation of 
domestic specifications of human rights may lead to recognizing parochial conceptions 
of human rights as minimal international human rights standards, thereby contradicting 
their claim to a universal justification (see, for example, Brems 1996; Benvenisti 1999). 
The best way to reply to the universality objection is by bringing in the more widespread 
and exact reverse objection: the 'parochialism objection' to the universality of interna-
tional human rights law itself. The latter objection is usually opposed to the claimed 
universality of international human rights law and based on what it regards as the largely 
parochial or cultural conceptions stemming from one dominant culture or set of cultures 
and imposed by international human rights law in the name of universality on others. 
The objection has different grounds: international human rights law may be parochial 
because there is no universal moral standard to start with or, in a more pluralist version 
240 Handbook on global constitutionalism 
of the objection, because there is more than one universal moral standard, on the one 
hand, or, in a less sceptical version of the objection, because of our epistemic limitations, 
on the other (for the other parochialism-objections to the universality of human rights, 
see Buchanan 2008, 2017; Besson 20 l 3a). It is the latter form of the objection that is anti-
thetical to the universality objection opposed to the proposed account of transnational 
human rights law and the one I focus on now. 
In reply to the universality objection, we may argue that the transnational making of 
human rights law actually amounts to a way to prevent parochial conceptions from being 
too quickly entrenched into international human rights law, and hence to protect the 
claimed universality of human rights from parochialism. As I argue in the next section, 
starting from many distinct domestic human rights' interpretations and comparing them 
on a transnational scale in order to identify a common ground, contribute to questioning 
the future international human rights standard and hence to making it less parochial. It 
prevents one domestic conception in particular from becoming too quickly, and without 
transnational probing, the international conception, and hence the alleged universal 
conception. In short, transnational human rights law could be seen as exhibiting a form 
of 'good parochialism' that should not be too quickly discarded if we are to protect the 
universality of human rights from the epistemic objection of 'bad parochialism'. 
Importantly, this epistemic argument for transnational human rights law does not 
mean that human rights should be regarded as 'self-certifying' (see Buchanan 2017). It is 
not because we regard a particular transnational practice as amounting to the realization 
of transnational human rights law that should be entrenched as a minimal international 
standard that that practice necessarily corresponds to the (however pluralistic) universal 
moral truth or, later on, that it captures one of its (however multi-faceted) correct moral 
interpretations. We may be entirely wrong about them and should be ready to correct 
them ourselves. However, it is likely that we will be able to ascertain what human rights are 
better in conditions where what we think, after having compared our respective reasoning 
on a transnational scale, to be human rights are realized, than doing so alone either on a 
merely domestic or on a purely international scale. This is not to say that there are no epis-
temic qualities in existing international human rights institutions, such as, for example, 
their inclusiveness, representativeness or deliberativeness (on these epistemic qualities, see 
Buchanan 2011, 2017), but only that these are actually best understood as complementary 
and transnational in their functioning rather than unilateral and top-down. That is, the 
epistemic qualities usually granted to international human rights law and institutions are 
exactly those captured by their transnationality. 
THE TRANSNATIONALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
DETERMINED 
The transnationality of human rights law so justified has direct implications for how we 
should understand its sources, both domestic and international, that is, the way human 
rights law is made and specified in practice (for a full argument, see Besson 2016a; 2017a). 
One common methodological feature to sources of human rights law is that they all 
use transnational human rights comparison to determine the existence of a transnational 
human rights consensus. 
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Transnational Human Rights Comparison 
Since 1945, human rights comparison has become the main and shared method of 
domestic (see Waldron 2011, p. 423) and international human rights' institutions alike (see 
McCrudden 2014, 2015). It enables them to identify commonalities in the transnational 
domestic practice of human rights and, accordingly, to consolidate them into minimal 
international human rights standards. Importantly, these domestic and international 
comparisons pertain to both domestic and international human rights law and not only 
to one of them, and this whether it is operated by an international human rights body or 
court or domestic ones. 
What differentiates transnational human rights comparisons from more traditional 
nineteenth-century constitutional comparisons is not only their authors and their scope, 
but also their function. If there is human rights comparison in the contemporary dual 
human rights regime, it is because human rights law is transnational and shares a common 
ground, not merely because it is interesting, or even strategic, to compare domestic prac-
tices and borrow from some of them (Besson 2018). 
Because human rights' comparison plays a distinct function in transnational human 
rights law, its justifications are also distinct from those usually put forward for com-
parative constitutional law in general, such as conceptual clarification in particular (see 
McCrudden 2000; Waldron 2005; Waldron 2011, pp. 411, 418, 420 ff.).6 This has implica-
tions, in turn, for the authority of comparative human rights law and the transnational 
common law identified. Its authority is not only theoretical, for instance when a compari-
son is informative or persuasive, as is the case in comparative constitutional law in general 
(see Mccrudden 2000, p. 513), but truly practical and hence binding (Waldron 2012, pp. 
62, 76, 93; Besson 2018). This applies to international human rights' courts and institu-
tions, but also arguably to domestic ones. 
The first justification for the authority of human rights comparison is democratic. 
Ironically, however, one of the most serious critiques usually put forward against the 
legitimate authority of comparative human rights law is the democratic critique. It is 
generally argued indeed that using human rights' interpretations stemming from other 
domestic jurisdictions amounts to a clear violation of the democratic principle (see 
McCrudden 2000, p. 501 ff., 529 ff.; Waldron 2011, p. 412 ff.). It follows from this chap-
ter's argument about the mutual validation and legitimation of domestic and inten1a-
tional human rights law, on the contrary, that comparative constitutional law provides 
the best way to grasp what is common among democratic states' human rights practice 
and hence what democracy amounts to minimally (see Buchanan 2004, p. 189; Besson 
2018). 
Independent from or additionally to the democratic justification, another justifica-
tion for the authority of human rights comparison is epistemic. It echoes the epistemic 
justification for the transnationality of human rights law discussed previously in the 
6 To that extent, it may even be misleading to refer to it as 'comparative international 
human rights law' as yet another branch of comparative international law (McCrudden 2015). 
Comparison is indeed inherent to the implementation of international human rights law itself (see 
Besson 2017b). 
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chapter. Based on the proposed reflexive social-moral epistemology of human rights (see 
Buchanan 2010a, 2017), we may consider that human rights comparison is the best way to 
determine what human rights are. Because our beliefs may be distorted by our parochial 
social practices, it is important that a comparison takes place between different domestic 
and international human rights law and institutions, and therefore has a transnational 
scope. Methodologically, human rights comparison is grounded in the universality of 
human rights, but takes into account the need for local socio-political contextualization 
in the specification and interpretation of their corresponding duties and content (Besson 
2018). So doing, it enables the constant passage from the universal to the particular, and 
from the latter to the former. 
Transnational Human Rights Consensus 
Unlike that which may be the case in other comparative law contexts, the compara-
tive outcome that should be identified through human rights comparison is known in 
advance: this is the human rights' 'common law', 'common ground' or 'consensus' across 
the various domestic interpretations of human rights compared (Besson 2018). The 
. minimal common ground so identified may then, if it is validated by international human 
rights law and institutions, become entrenched as a minimal international human rights 
standard that can bind domestic authorities in return and be submitted to their further 
interpretation and practice. 
The terms used to capture the common ground in transnational human rights law vary 
considerably. The most common term is international, global or transnational 'consen-
sus'. It is the case of the 'European consensus' in the ECHR's system (see Wildhaber et 
al. 2013), but we also find references to 'regional consent' in the American Convention on 
Human Rights' (IACHR's) system (see Neuman 2008). 
The 'European consensus', or 'converging approach', corresponds to a form of inter-
pretative custom of the ECHR developed among state parties (see Ziemele 2012). It is 
based on European states' general practice (the latter need not be unanimous, and is 
mostly based on a ratio of six out of ten states, on average; see Wildhaber et al. 2013), on 
the one hand, and their opinio Juris, on the other. 
The two elements constitutive of the consensus are verified by reference to various 
legal materials: some domestic (for example, domestic legislation or judicial decisions) 
and some international (for example, other international human rights treaties or norms 
and their interpretations by their respective international organs); some soft and some 
hard; some internal to some or all the states parties to the ECHR and some external to 
that group of States (see ECtHR, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, paras 85- 6; ECtHR, 
Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece, para. 66; see also McCrudden 2013; Ziemele 
2012; Wildhaber et al. 2013; Besson and Graf-Brugere 2014; Dzehtsiarou 2015). The latter 
comparative reference to international law external to European states parties, or, at least, 
to those at stake in a given case, and hence to international law that does not bind them, 
has been contested (see Letsas 2010). The court has since then confirmed its universal-
izing practice, however (see ECtHR, Case of the National Union of Rail, Maritime and 
Transport Workers v. the United Kingdom, paras 76, 98). What matters, it has stressed, is 
that the relevant evidence 'denote[s] a continuous evolution in the norms and principles 
applied in international law or in the domestic law of the majority of member States of the 
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Council of Europe and show[s], in a precise area, that there is common ground in modern 
societies' (ECtHR, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, para. 86). 
European states' consensus constrains the court's evolutive interpretation of the ECHR 
and guides it. According to the ECtHR, the reference to consensus and the evolution 
of state practice actually amounts to a duty, and not just a possibility (see ECtHR, 
Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece, para. 66; ECtHR, Demir and Baykara v. 
Turkey, para. 85: 'can and must'). More specifically, the 'European consensus' so defined 
has been used to establish the degree or intensity of the margin of appreciation of states 
when specifying and restricting international human rights' duties (see, for example, 
Mowbray 2014; Spano 2014; Spielmann 2014; Dzehtsiarou 2015). 
Regrettably, the 'European consensus' is not the sole criterion or test at play in the 
ECtHR's reasoning pertaining to the margin of appreciation, however, and its applica-
tion remains largely unpredictable as a result (see, for example, Mowbray 2014; Spano 
2014; Spielmann 2014; Dzehtsiarou 2015). Nevertheless, there are ways for the European 
consensus to be streamlined, and then generalized into other regional, but also universal 
human rights regimes (Besson 2017b ). 
Thus, the 'transnational human rights consensus' could work as the effectivity test for 
human rights' subsidiarity qua complementarity (see, for a full argument, Besson 2016b ). 
Referring to the transnational consensus of democratic states as the minimal effective 
standard of human rights protection is the way to secure the democratic legitimacy of 
international human rights institutions' or courts' review without, however, turning inter-
national human rights case-law into an incoherent and hence non-egalitarian patchwork 
of individual domestic albeit democratic specifications (contra: Gerards 2014; Letsas 
2017). Of course, the existence or absence of a transnational human rights consensus 
should only protect states' margin of appreciation within the egalitarian limits of sub-
sidiarity, that is, provided non-discrimination rights and the fundamental core of human 
rights are not at stake. Conversely, and for the same democratic reasons, setting aside the 
priority of domestic authorities, and especially reducing their margin of appreciation, 
in cases that pertain to political rights that are therefore closely related to democracy, 
requires a strong degree of transnational consensus or, depending on the circumstances, 
may not even be justified in certain rare cases (see, for example, ECtHR, Sitaropoulos 
and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece, paras 63- 5; see also Besson and Graf-Brugere 2014, pp. 
953-4). 
At this point, we may object that not all states are democratic, and that this jeopardizes 
the democratic argument for a democratic transnational consensus in human rights law 
(for a full discussion, see Besson 2018). This is a false problem, first, because all states 
parties to international human rights treaties have to be democratic as much as they have 
to respect human rights. Thus, their consensus has to be incrementally democratic, just 
as they incrementally have to protect human rights. Secondly, more specifically, when 
states have not ensured sufficient democratic deliberation in a given human rights case, 
their margin of appreciation should be limited or non-existent because the condition 
for the latter, that is domestic reason-giving, is not fulfilled (see follesdal 2017). As I 
explained before, in the absence of the latter, states should not be allowed to contribute 
further to the transnational development of the international human rights standard 
(Besson 2018). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
While constitutional law scholars have done some of the mapping of the transnational 
practice of human rights, and especially of comparisons in domestic (constitutional) and 
international human rights law, this is not yet true of their theoretical underpinnings. 
Aiming at filling this gap, and after some clarifications of the concept of transnationality 
in law in general and in human rights law in particular, the chapter started by justifying 
the transnationality of human rights law on democratic and epistemic grounds, before 
drawing implications for its determination methods whose practice remains largely irregu-
lar and in need of justification, that is, human rights comparison and the transnational 
human rights consensus it thereby identifies. 
From a political perspective, the proposed transnational reading of human rights law 
has important implications for the way we should deal with the growing resistance against 
international human rights law and courts in democratic states. Those courts cannot and 
should not be identified with other international courts that enforce international law 
top-down and claim ultimate interpretative authority over domestic courts. As a result, 
domestic judges, and institutions more generally, should not fear to engage with inter-
national human rights law and courts for it is the only way international human rights 
law can develop and be interpreted transnationally and hence democratically. When they 
deliberate with one another over international human rights law, domestic institutions act 
neither as international law's agents or trustees nor as self-interested actors, contrary to 
what some scholars have argued, but as primary interpreters of our transnational consti-
tutional values of democracy and human rights. 
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